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Abstract 
In the housing markets, three basic facts have been repeatedly reported by empirical 
studies: the existence of price dispersion, the positive correlation between housing price 
and time-on-the-market, and between housing price and trading volume. Since housing 
markets are also characterised by a decentralised framework of exchange with 
important search and matching frictions, this paper examines whether the baseline 
search and matching model, i.e. the Mortensen-Pissarides model, can account for these 
three basic facts. We find that the behaviour of the housing market reflected in the 
above empirical findings can be addressed adequately by the standard matching 
framework. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Housing markets are characterised by a decentralised exchange framework with 
important search and matching frictions. It has, in fact, been acknowledged that 
housing markets clear not only through price but also through the time and money 
that a buyer and a seller spend on the market. Consequently, the search and matching 
approach is widely used even in the real estate market (see section 2). 
Furthermore, three basic facts have been repeatedly reported: (a) the positive 
correlation between housing price and time-on-the-market (see Leung, Leong and 
Chan, 2002; Anglin et al. 2003; Merlo and Ortalo-Magne, 2004, among others);
1
 (b) the 
positive correlation between housing price and trading volume (see Leung, Lau and 
Leong, 2002; Fisher et al., 2003, among others); (c) the existence of price dispersion. 
Although price dispersion research is more commonly found in studies of non-durable 
consumption goods (see Baye et al., 2006), price dispersion studies on durable and re-
saleable goods such as real estate are also growing rapidly (for an overview see Leung, 
Leong and Wong, 2006). Price dispersion (or price volatility) is probably the most 
important distinctive feature of housing markets. It refers to the phenomenon of 
selling two houses with very similar attributes and in near locations at the same time 
but at very different prices. In a nutshell, the variance in house prices cannot be 
attributed completely to the heterogeneous nature of real estate. Remaining price 
differentials are in fact empirically non negligible. A significant part of housing price 
dispersion is basically due to the heterogeneity of buyers and sellers, in particular their 
sustained search costs (see e.g. Leung and Zhang, 2011). Vukina and Zheng (2010) find 
very strong empirical support for the theoretical prediction that bargaining with search 
costs explains price dispersion in the agricultural market. 
The main aim of this paper is to show that the matching framework is able to 
explain the basic facts of housing markets without any significant deviation from the 
baseline model (see e.g. the textbook by Pissarides, 2000). Precisely, we develop a 
housing market matching model in which a seller can become a buyer and vice versa. 
Hence, the proposed work takes the distinctive feature of the considered market into 
account, since buyers today are potential sellers tomorrow (Leung, Leong and Wong, 
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2006), and most houses are bought by those who already own one, and most houses 
are sold by those wanting to buy another house (Janssen et al., 1994). Furthermore, in 
this model, price dispersion exists only assuming a different number of houses per 
capita. Also, this simple theoretical model is able to explain, in a straightforward 
manner, two other well-known empirical regularities, namely the positive correlation 
between housing price and time-on-the-market, and between housing price and 
trading volume. Therefore, this paper clearly shows that the behaviour of the housing 
market, reflected in the above empirical findings, can be addressed adequately by the 
standard matching framework.
2
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 briefly reviews the 
literature which makes use of search and matching models to study the housing 
market; section 3 presents the housing market matching model; while section 4 
concludes the work. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This paper belongs to the recent and growing literature that uses search and matching 
models to explain the behaviour of housing markets. The first search model of the 
housing market is Wheaton’s (1990). Since then, several papers have developed 
models to analyse the formation process of prices in housing markets with 
search/matching/trading frictions (Krainer, 2001; Albrecht et al., 2007, 2009; Caplin 
and Leahy, 2008; Novy-Marx, 2009; Ngai and Tenreyro, 2009; Diaz and Jerez, 2009; 
Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 2010; Leung and Zhang, 2011; 
Peterson, 2012). 
Furthermore, recent search and matching models of the housing market (Diaz 
and Jerez, 2009; Novy-Marx, 2009; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 
2010; Leung and Zhang, 2011; Peterson, 2012) adopt an aggregate matching function 
and some of them also focus on the role of market tightness in determining the 
probability of matching between the parties. This is in line with the standard matching 
approach (see Pissarides, 2000). The main difference between our model and those in 
the quoted studies is that we closely track the standard matching framework à la 
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Mortensen-Pissarides without any significant deviation from the baseline model. For 
example, Diaz and Jerez (2009), Novy-Marx (2009), Genesove and Han (2010), Leung 
and Zhang (2011), and Peterson (2012) define the market tightness from a buyer 
perspective, i.e. housing market tightness is the ratio of buyers to sellers. Instead, we 
prefer to use the standard definition of tightness, thus considering the ratio of vacant 
houses to home seekers (the buyers). In the labour market, in fact, tightness is the 
ratio of job vacancies to job seekers. 
Among this literature, our model is most related to the competitive search 
framework developed by Leung and Zhang (2011), since it aims to explain the three 
basic facts of the housing market. In Leung and Zhang (2011), a necessary condition for 
explaining the housing market facts is the heterogeneity on the seller's and/or the 
buyer's side, which generates corresponding submarkets. Precisely, Leung and Zhang 
(2011) focus on one-side heterogeneity and assume that sellers are different in terms 
of their waiting costs for selling the house, where buyers are free to enter either 
submarket. However, in their model the reservation value of a buyer is exogenous and 
sellers commit to “stay” in one of the submarkets.
3
 Unlike Leung and Zhang (2011), we 
develop a matching model which is consistent with both a single housing market and 
different search-housing markets with heterogeneous fundamentals. Furthermore, in 
our model the free-entry or zero-profit condition for sellers à la Pissarides, rather than 
the buyer's free entry assumption used by Leung and Zhang (2011), allows to obtain a 
solution which characterises the direct relationship between market tightness and 
house price.
4
 The free-entry condition for sellers is also used by Albrecht et al. (2009) 
to endogenise housing market tightness. Nevertheless, in their model, search is 
directed rather than random, houses are sold by auction rather than by bargaining and 
sellers post prices to attract buyers. 
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 Sellers with higher waiting costs (the so-called impatient or "fire-sale" sellers) are willing to accept 
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 In Leung and Zhang (2011), the equilibrium is in fact determined by a system of three equations in 
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3. A MATCHING MODEL OF HOUSING MARKET 
3.1 The hypotheses of the model 
We adopt a standard matching framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides (see e.g. 
Pissarides, 2000) with random search and prices determined by Nash bargaining. The 
random matching assumption is absolutely compatible with a market where the formal 
distinction between the demand and supply side is very subtle; whereas, bargaining is 
a natural outcome of decentralised markets for heterogeneous goods. 
The economy is populated by buyers (b) and sellers (s) who hold a certain 
number of homes (h). Precisely, sellers hold 1h >  houses of which 1h −  are on the 
market: hence, vacancies (v ) are simply given by ( ) s1hv ⋅−= . Instead, buyers expend 
costly search effort to find a new or better house: in fact, they already hold a house, 
i.e. 1h = , and there are no homeless persons, namely buyers with 0h = . In the model, 
it is therefore possible that a buyer can become a seller and vice versa. Indeed, a buyer 
becomes a seller after buying another house.
5
 
Since we are interested in selling price, the market of reference is the 
homeownership market rather than the rental market. In this way, if a contract is 
legally binding (as hypothesised) it is no longer possible to return to the circumstances 
preceding the bill of sale, unless a new and distinct contractual relationship is set up. In 
matching model jargon this means that the destruction rate of a specific buyer-seller 
match does not exist. As a result, the value of an occupied home for a seller is simply 
given by the selling price and, therefore, the expected values of a vacant house (V ) 
and of finding a house (H ) are the following:
6
 
( ) [ ]VPθqarV −⋅+−=                             [1] 
( ) [ ]PHxθgerH −−⋅+−=                                                                                                       [2] 
where v/bθ ≡  is the “overall” housing market tightness from the sellers’ standpoint; 
while ( )θq  and ( )θg  are, respectively, the (instantaneous) probability of filling a 
vacant house and of finding a home. The standard hypothesis of constant returns to 
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 Time is continuous; individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely and discount future payoffs at the 
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scale in the matching function, { }bv,mm = , is adopted (see Pissarides, 2000; 
Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), since it is also used in the recent search models of 
the housing market (see Diaz and Jerez, 2009; Novy-Marx, 2009; Piazzesi and 
Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 2010; Leung and Zhang, 2011; Peterson, 2012). 
Hence, the properties of these functions are straightforward: ( ) 0θq' < , ( ) 0θg' > , 
( ) ( ) ∞==
∞→→ θglimθqlim θ0θ , and ( ) ( ) 0θqlimθglim θ0θ == ∞→→ .7 Finally, the term a  
represents the cost flows sustained by sellers for the advertisement of vacancies; 
whereas, e  represents the effort flows in monetary terms made by buyers to find and 
visit the largest possible number of houses. If a contract is stipulated, the buyer gets a 
linear benefit x  from the property, which coincides with the value of the house 
(abandoning the home searching value) and pays the sale price P  to the seller (who 
abandons the value of finding another buyer). The value of the house depends on the 
housing characteristics and it does not depend on the buyer's tastes.
8
 
 
3.2 The equilibrium 
In the housing market with search frictions, the endogenous variables that are 
determined simultaneously at equilibrium are market tightness ( θ ) and sale price (P ). 
The customary long-term equilibrium condition, namely the “zero-profit” or 
“free-entry” condition, normally used in the matching models (see Pissarides, 2000) 
yields the first key relationship of the model, in which market tensions are a positive 
function of price. In fact, using the condition 0V =  in [1], we obtain: 
( ) ( ) P/aθqθqa/P 1 =⇒= −                 [3] 
with 0Pθ/ >∂∂ , since ( ) ( )θ1/qθq 1 ≡−  is increasing in θ . This positive relationship is 
very intuitive: in fact, if the price increases, more vacant houses will be on the market. 
Instead, the generalised Nash bargaining solution, usually used for 
decentralised markets, allows the sale price P  to be obtained through the optimal 
subdivision of surplus deriving from a successful match. The surplus is defined as the 
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 Also in Albrecht et al. (2007) and Leung and Zhang (2011) the value of the house is independent of 
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sum of the seller’s and buyer’s value when the trade takes place, net of the respective 
external options, i.e. the value of continuing to search:
 
 
( ) ( ) HxHPxVPsurplus
buyer of gaincapital   sellerof gaincapital  
−=−−+−=
43421321
 
The price is then obtained by solving the following optimisation condition (recall that 
in equilibrium 0V = ): 
( ) ( ){ }γ1γ PHxVPargmax P −−−⋅−= ( ) ( )PHxγ1 γP −−⋅−=⇒  ( )HxγP −⋅=⇒  
where 1γ0 <<  is the share of bargaining power of sellers. Entering into a contractual 
agreement obviously implies that the surplus is always positive, i.e. Hx > , θ∀ . This 
realistic condition on the buyers’ side also ensures that the price is positive. Simple 
manipulations yield the equation for the selling price: 
( )
( ) ( )γ1θgr
erxγ
P
−⋅+
+⋅
=
                                                                                                                   
[4] 
As market tensions increase, the probability of finding a home increases, and the sale 
price decreases; hence, we obtain the second key relationship of the model: 
0θP/ <∂∂ . In short, if the market tightness increases, the effect of the well-known 
congestion externalities on the demand side (see Pissarides, 2000) will lower the price. 
P
θ*θ
*P
A
0θP/ <∂∂
0Pθ/ >∂∂
 
FIGURE 1. Equilibrium price and market tightness 
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Given the properties of the matching probabilities, it is straightforward to 
obtain from equation [3] that when P  tends to zero (infinity), θ  tends to zero 
(infinity), since ( )θq  tends to infinity (zero). Consequently, given the negative slope of 
equation [4], with positive intercept, i.e. ( )e/rxγPlim 0θ +⋅=→ , and the fact that the 
selling price is always positive, only one long term equilibrium deriving from the 
intersection of the two curves exists in the model (see point A in Figure 1). 
Finally, the optimal number of houses per capita h is obtained by the 
maximisation of the expected overall profit, namely the profit arising from the sale of 
all houses on the market. Since the value of an occupied home for a seller is simply 
given by the selling price, the expected overall profit to maximise is the following: 
{ } ( ) P1hrΠmaxh ⋅−=  
( ) ( ) 0
θP/
P
1h0θP/1hP
0
>





∂∂
−=−⇒=∂∂⋅−+⇒
<
321
                                                             
[5] 
An increase in vacant houses on the market, in fact, reduces the selling price. It follows 
that the number of houses on the market, (h – 1), is always positive, namely the 
number of houses held by sellers, h, is always higher than 1.
 
Eventually, in order to close the model, we normalise the population in the 
housing market to the unit, bs1 += , i.e. a person is either a seller or a buyer, but not 
both, at any point in time. As a result, given the equilibrium value of market tightness 
and price, *P  and *θ , we find the optimal number of houses per capita, h, and after 
the stock of sellers and buyers.
9
 
 
3.3 The trade-off between house prices and time-on-the-market 
The free-entry condition implies a trade-off between the housing price and the speed 
of sale for the seller. In fact, with a probability of filling a vacant house of ( )θq , the 
expected time-on-the-market is ( ) 1θq − . As a result, from [3] there is a positive 
correlation between housing price and the time-on-the-market, since a higher price 
requires a longer time to sell a house (as pointed out by Leung, Leong and Chan, 2002; 
Anglin et al. 2003; Merlo and Ortalo-Magne, 2004; Leung and Zhang, 2011). 
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Indeed, by combining equations [3] and [4], this model is able to reproduce the 
observed joint behaviour of prices and time-on-the-market: in fact, the house with a 
higher selling price has a longer time on the market (see equation [3]), but, ceteris 
paribus, as shown by equation [4], the longer the time-on-the-market the lower the 
sale price (see Krainer, 2001; Merlo and Ortalo-Magne, 2004; Leung and Zhang, 2011; 
Diaz and Jerez, 2009), since both ( ) 1θq −  and ( )θg  are increasing in θ . 
Consequently, the first proposition can be stated: 
PROPOSITION 1: The standard matching model extended to the housing market 
is able to mimic the trade-off between selling price and time-on-the-market. 
 
3.4 Matching rate and trading volume 
From equation [4], the selling price clearly depends on the bargaining power of the 
parties. Also, the selling price crucially depends on the search costs of buyers and 
sellers. In particular, from [4] it is straightforward to obtain that an increase in the 
search effort of buyers increases the selling price, since a higher e  implies a more 
eager buyer. As regards the effect of advertising vacancies on the selling price, an 
increase in a  decreases market tightness θ , which in turn increases the selling price 
(since ( )θg  is lower). In short, an increase in the seller’s search cost also leads to an 
increase in the selling price. 
Intuitively, the trading volume for a given period, i.e. the number of contracts 
traded during a given period, is given by the matching function/rate (see Leung and 
Zhang, 2011). Since the search intensity and the cost of advertising vacancies may be 
seen as parameters of technological change in the matching function (see Pissarides, p. 
124, 2000), it is straightforward to include the search cost/effort of sellers and buyers 
in the matching function, i.e. { }be v,amm ⋅⋅= , with bv/eaθ ⋅⋅≡ .10 Indeed, on the one 
hand, the search process involves costs; on the other, those costs allow the matching 
probability to increase. Hence, an increase in the search effort or in advertising 
vacancies will increase the matching rate m . As a result, the model can also explain 
the positive relationship between housing price and trading volume, since an increase 
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in the search costs of buyers and sellers increases both the selling price and the 
matching rate. This theoretical result is in line with the empirical works of Fisher et al. 
(2003) and Leung, Lau and Leong (2002). 
This result can be summarized in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2: In the baseline Mortensen-Pissarides model of the housing 
market we can find a positive correlation between house prices and trading volume. 
 
3.5 Number of houses per capita and price dispersion 
From the maximisation of the expected overall profit, we get a unique value of h for 
each seller. However, in the real world the number of houses per capita h is not the 
same among sellers. Indeed, it also depends on external factors as legacies, business 
cycle, property tax, location, etc. 
Thus, we distinguish between the ex-ante value of h and its ex-post (optimal) 
value. Precisely, the number of houses per capita ex-ante ranges between 2 and a 
maximum value n , i.e. nh2 ≤≤ . It follows that the number of vacant houses on the 
market is different according to the value of n:
11
 
( )∑
=
−⋅
−
=
n
2h
1h
1n
s
v                              [6] 
As a result, different equilibrium values of market tightness and price are 
obtained. Indeed, a market with a larger number of sellers and/or vacant houses will 
have in equilibrium a higher value of market tightness, since 
( ) /b1h
1n
s
v/bθ*
n
2h






−⋅
−
=≡ ∑
=
; while, the opposite is true in the case of a market with 
a lower number of sellers/vacancies. Therefore, housing prices would be different 
even for identical or similar houses, i.e. houses which have identical or similar housing 
characteristics and thus give the same buyers’ benefit x. 
Thus, the following proposition applies: 
PROPOSITION 3: Price dispersion exists in the basic model à la Mortensen-
Pissarides only assuming different number of houses per capita in the housing market. 
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( ) 1)s/(nhs −= , h ∀ . 
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Eventually, from [5] different equilibrium values of market tightness and price 
imply different (ex-post) optimal values of h. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Housing markets are characterised by a decentralised framework of exchange with 
important search and matching frictions. Furthermore, three basic facts have been 
repeatedly reported by empirical studies: 1) the variance in house prices cannot be 
completely attributed to the heterogeneous nature of real estate and the residual 
price volatility is empirically non negligible; 2) the positive relationship between 
housing price and the number of contracts traded during a given period (the trading 
volume); 3) the trade-off between housing price and the speed of sale for the seller. 
This theoretical paper clearly shows that the behaviour of housing markets, reflected 
in the above empirical findings, can be addressed adequately by the standard matching 
framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides without any significant deviation from the 
baseline model. 
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